Activity
Based Accounting is the unbundling of costs and the rational assignment of
those costs to the action that generated them.
In
review, I seem to be fond of the word “proxy”.
In a management situation, proxies are used when the characteristic of interest
(let’s assume “profit” or “true costs” for the remainder of the essay) is
difficult or impossible to measure.
A
common scenario is to choose a proxy that demonstrates good correlation to
the characteristic of interest but is much easier to measure. The production process evolves and the
correlation becomes less strong over time.
Additionally, there are perverse forces in effect that actively try to
split them. In time, the proxy and the
characteristic become completely decoupled and management fixates on whipping a
dead horse, the continual improvement of the proxy while the characteristic of
interest is in free-fall.
An
example would be the use of “time card hours” to allocate fixed costs in a
factory. In the 1920s, direct labor was
80% of a typical factory’s cost. Since
people were sprinkled though the factory in a fairly uniform way, the “rent”
for a specific product could be allocated on the basis of manhours required to
make it. And even if this induced
inaccuracies, the “rent” was a small portion of the total cost and the
inaccuracies were small.
Flash
forward to the 1980s. Direct labor was
no longer 80% of the cost, it was closer to 20% of the cost. Products were characterized by more fixed
costs: more engineering, more sophisticated tooling, more compliance
costs. Facilities entered into
death-spirals when they fixated on eliminated direct labor so-as to make other
products produced within the facility absorb a larger share of the fixed
costs. Obviously, eliminating Joe Lunch-bucket
eliminated a very small sliver of fixed costs but the GAAP pricing acted as if eliminating Joe Lunchbucket eliminated all of the fixed costs that had, hither-to-fore, been assigned to him.
Taken
to its logical extreme, the last direct labor employee carried a fixed cost
burden of every salary employee associated with all products made within the
building as well as the cost of the building.
The internet era
The
internet era revealed another set of cost misallocations.
The
business model (and I really hate that term, business model) for many service
providers was to undercharge for the service but then make it back on product
pricing associated with that service. People who struggled to accept paying lots of money for an intangible, service, happily payed money for something they could carry out the door.
Vision
Examples
include the optometrist. I pay $83 for
an exam which is not enough to keep the lights on. The optometrists expect the patient to step
into the next room and pay $400 for a pair of eyeglasses. This was the norm when health insurance was
more generous and there was no internet to shop on. Now I can go to Zenni Optical and pay $9 for
a pair of eyeglasses or go to Walmart and pay $35 a pair.
Further,
the on-line store has no way of verifying that my prescription is not over a
year old. I can use last year’s
prescription if my eyesight has not drifted, thereby negating the need for
another trip to the optometrist. I can
pay $13 ($9 plus shipping) when my lenses get scratched up as opposed to the
$483 of the old model.
Many
optometrists are locked into the failing business model and are riding a death
spiral. They are afraid to raise their
rates to match the true economic costs of providing them. They are loath to renegotiate their leases to
dump the showroom floor. They are stuck.
Veterinarians
Other
examples include Veterinarians. They
discount their services and expect to make it back selling worming products and
specialty pet food. Again, any person
who is willing to read the back of the product can order products with the same
active ingredients much more cheaply from Amazon or ValleyVet.com.
General Practice medicine
A
third example is the GP medical practitioner.
Medicaid, Medicare and other health insurances cap the cost of an annual
physical. The $117 I pay does not come
close to the cost of the doctor’s time for my annual physical. The office has to make that back by spending
a little bit less time on each chronic ear infection visit and from the
hypochondriacs. They need to make a
little bit more on ancillary services like imaging (X-Rays) and allergy shots.
Two
of the examples given above were driven by insurance. Insurance separates customers, the cost of
providing and prices. The providers make
a series of rational responses to those pressures which leaves them less seaworthy
when faced with changes in the business climate.
Back to the lumber business
Tom
Leep is sharp enough to realize that nearly all of the profit of timbering off
a tract might be driven by just a few prime logs. Most timber buyers are “lumpers”. They will look at the total cost of
harvesting a tract and the total, expected revenues. That thinking causes them to underestimate
the value of the highest value trees and overvalue the cost of the “trashy”
trees.
This
thinking is fostered by professional foresters.
They see their job as managing the woodlot. They will advise the harvest of trees that
are uneconomical to harvest because it will “release” the growth of trees with
greater future value. An example might
be of an overstory of Box Elder overshadowing a stand of young Sugar Maple or
oak. The forester's advice couples the cost of harvesting the tract with the cost of managing it for future
profit.
Tom
Leep’s business model separates out the harvesting costs and the management
costs. Further, by working on a
percentage, he does not have to bid conservatively to protect himself against
the vicissitudes of the market and Mother Nature. Leep and the landowner share the impact of
log(s) that might be hollow, be riddled with fencing wire or tree-stand steps
or that the spot prices for timber take a dive.
Sharing those risks with the landowner usually resulted in the landowner
getting a larger check.
The
key enabler is that the property owner had to be able to trust Tom. Trust is earned.
Spot on, on the veterinarians. Prior generations shot mine and those following me in the foot (or arse) by tying income/profit to markup on drugs, vaccines, etc., rather than valuing their knowledge and capabilities and charging accordingly.
ReplyDeleteIn today's Internet Age, anyone who can Google can find many of the drugs, vaccines, specialty products online... and if they see that they can buy XXX for $2.50, and their veterinarian is charging $25 a pop... well, they either get mad at being gouged, or at minimum, lose trust and gain some suspicion.
As far back as 1985, I knew one veterinarian who'd adopted the MD's model... he kept little or no inventory... charged for his services, and wrote a prescription for the client to fill at any local pharmacy. He was ahead of his time.
Then, we get into student debt & ROI... With many of these aspiring new veterinarians coming out of vet school with school loan debt in excess of $200K (associated only with vet school - undergrad loans add to the total)... I don't see how these kids are gonna make it...What were they thinking?